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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Rumination, a maladaptive cognitive style of responding to 
negative mood, is thought to be maintained by a variety of cognitive biases. However, it is 
unknown whether rumination is characterized by interpretation biases.    
Methods:  Two experiments examined the link between rumination and interpretation biases, 
revealed in lexical-decision tasks (LDT). A homograph with both benign and ruminative or 
otherwise negative meaning was presented on each trial and followed by a letter string, to which 
participants responded by judging whether it was a word or a non-word. Letter strings were non-
words or words related or unrelated to one meaning of the homograph. 
Results: In both experiments, faster latencies to respond to targets related to the ruminative 
meaning of the homographs were produced by students with higher scores on self-report 
measures of rumination. Moreover, these biases were associated with both brooding, the 
maladaptive form of rumination, and reflection, the more adaptive component. No measure of 
rumination was significantly correlated with general biases toward negative meaning 
(Experiment 1) or with threatening interpretations of homographs (Experiment 2). 
Limitations: The paucity of available rumination-related homographs dictated the use of non-
fully randomized stimuli presentation (Experiment 1) or the use of only one set of the meanings 
associated with the homographs (Experiment 2). 
Conclusions: Rumination is associated with a tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a 
rumination-consistent manner. This tendency may exacerbate ruminative thinking and can 
possibly be a target for future intervention.  
 
Keywords: rumination, brooding, interpretation bias, information processing
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Interpretation Bias Characterizes Trait Rumination 
 
Rumination, a cognitive habit of repetitively analyzing one’s problems, concerns, and 
negative feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), is a particularly maladaptive form of self-focus (Mor 
& Winquist, 2002). Rumination predicts depression both prospectively and concurrently (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), and is considered a transdiagnostic factor in 
psychopathology (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011) because measures of rumination 
predict symptoms of anxiety, eating disorders, substance abuse and alcohol abuse. (See Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010, for a recent meta-analysis.) 
Although originally construed as a unitary construct, later research identified two 
subtypes of ruminative thinking: brooding and reflection (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Schoofs, 
Hermans, & Raes, 2010; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2011). Whereas brooding is a perseverative, passive, and judgmental focus on one’s mood, 
reflection is a contemplative, intentional pondering of one’s mood in order to engage in problem 
solving. Brooding is considered the maladaptive aspect of rumination and is the form of 
rumination that is most associated with psychopathology (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & 
Bohon, 2007; Watkins, 2009).  
It has been argued that rumination exerts its negative effects by making negative content 
more accessible (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Indeed, ruminators, and particularly brooders, 
exhibit a variety of cognitive biases that maintain negative emotional states. Specifically, recent 
research has shown that brooding is associated with preferential attention to negative and self-
related information and to difficulty ignoring, inhibiting, or forgetting such information 
(Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Daches, Mor, Winquist, & Gilboa-Shechtman, 2010; Joormann, 
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Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006), as well as with memory deficits such as decreased specificity of 
autobiographical memory (Debeer, Hermans & Raes, 2009).  
Although interpretation biases play a central role in theories of depression and anxiety 
(Beck, 1967), they have so far not been examined in relation to rumination. Interpretations are 
thought to maintain negative emotional states by strengthening negative self-beliefs and 
reinforcing negative memory biases (e.g., Hertel et al., 2008). Interestingly, several recent 
studies have failed to find evidence for interpretive biases in depression (e.g., Bisson & Sears, 
2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006). Indeed, self-referential 
processing may be necessary for these biases to emerge (e.g., Hindash & Amir, 2012; Wisco & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), and ruminative thinking may thereby provide the link between 
depression and the tendency to infuse ambiguous stimuli with negative meaning. 
Negative interpretations of an ambiguous event can exacerbate the tendency to ruminate 
by fueling future thoughts of its now disambiguated meaning; in this way interpretation biases 
can contribute to the spiraling relation between rumination and negative mood states (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). Interpretation biases have also been related to worry (Hayes, Hirsch, 
Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009), a repetitive and negative cognitive 
style similar to rumination but focused on the future instead of the past. (For a review see Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008.) Moreover, dysphoric individuals who were induced to ruminate showed 
an interpretation bias, favoring negative interpretations of emotionally ambiguous content 
(Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006). However, despite the importance of interpretation biases in 
understanding psychopathology and the indirect evidence concerning their relation to ruminative 
thinking, there is to date no research showing that trait ruminators hold negative interpretation 
biases.  
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In two experiments, we investigated the link between rumination and interpretation 
biases. Several questions guided our research. We explored whether rumination is specifically 
associated with interpretation biases instead of merely with a tendency to respond quickly to 
stimuli with negative meaning, as depressed individuals have been shown to do (see Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005). We further examined whether interpretation biases are specific to brooding or 
are also linked to overall rumination and reflection. Finally, we evaluated the content specificity 
of the biases. To answer these questions, we used a paradigm developed by Richards and French 
(1992) to document interpretation biases in anxiety. In the original paradigm, participants 
performed a lexical decision task in which they were presented with a priming word followed by 
a target to be judged as a word or non-word. On critical trials, the primes were homographs with 
both threatening and benign meanings. Targets were words related to either the benign or the 
threatening meaning of the prime, unrelated benign and threatening words, and non-word letter 
strings. Richards and French found that anxious participants made faster decisions in response to 
targets that were related to the threatening meaning of the prime. In the current experiments, we 
were interested in whether the use of homographs with benign and ruminative meanings (e.g., 
bitter, finished) would invite a similar bias on the part of individuals with the habit of 
ruminating.  
Experiment 1 used a design identical to that of Richards and French (1992). In this study, 
benign and negative homograph-related and unrelated targets were used to contrast an 
interpretive-bias account with a general-negativity account. We predicted that rumination, and 
brooding in particular, would be characterized by faster latencies to respond to the target 
denoting the ruminative meaning of the homograph, compared to the target denoting its benign 
meaning. This facilitation was expected for the negative targets that were related to the preceding 
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homographs (denoting an interpretation bias) but not for negative but unrelated targets (denoting 
a negativity bias). In Experiment 2, to examine the specificity of the interpretation bias to 
rumination-related material, homographs with negative meanings that were either ruminative or 
threatening were used. We predicted that rumination would be associated with speeded 
responding to related as compared to unrelated targets denoting ruminative meanings but not 
when the targets denoted threatening meanings.  
Experiment 1 
Method  
Participants and Design 
Participants were 27 female and 22 male students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
who took part in the study in return for course credit or payment. Participants’ mean age was 25 
(SD = 2.70). All participants were native Hebrew speakers.  
Materials  
Lexical decision task. The task consisted of 80 trials, with each trial presenting a prime 
and a target.  Primes were Hebrew homographs that each had a benign meaning as well as a 
negative, rumination-related meaning. Targets were non-words on half of the trials and words on 
the other half. Word targets belonged to one of four categories: words related to the negative 
meaning of the homograph (related-negative, e.g., bitter-resentful), words related to the benign 
meaning of the homograph (related-benign, e.g., bitter-chocolate), benign words that were 
unrelated to either of the homograph meanings (unrelated-benign, e.g., bitter-branch), and 
negative words that were similarly unrelated (e.g., bitter-dirt).  
Because no homograph norms are available in Hebrew, we followed the procedure 
outlined by Richards and French (1992) in pretesting homographs and targets. Thus, student 
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volunteers listed associations for an initial pool of 140 negative/benign homographs. 
Homographs were selected if the benign and negative associations were similarly frequent. 
Subsequently, the valence of the two possible meanings of the selected homographs was rated in 
a new sample of volunteers. Rating was provided using a visual analog scale, on a 100-mm 
horizontal line whose ends were labeled "extremely negative" and ―not negative at all‖. The final 
set of 80 homographs, included homographs for which negative and benign associates were 
listed with similar frequency, and the selected associates for the homographs differed 
significantly in their valence. Non-word targets were created by changing one letter in benign 
unrelated words, so that each benign word produced a pronounceable non-word.  
Each homograph was presented once during the task and the order of trials was randomly 
determined for each participant. Because few rumination-related homographs are available in 
Hebrew, we did not use a fully randomized design in matching homograph primes with the four 
types of word targets and with non-word targets. We were most interested in differential priming 
of the related negative and benign meanings of the homographs (for a similar approach see 
Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule & Dalgleish, 2000). Therefore, each of the 20 homographs 
that we considered ―best‖ (for which negative and benign associates were generated with 
approximately equal frequency) was randomly matched across participants to a target that was 
related to either the negative or the benign meaning of the prime. Each of the 20 homographs for 
which the frequency of negative and benign associates was less comparable, was matched with 
either a benign or a negative unrelated target word. Pairing was done with caution to ensure that 
homographs were indeed semantically unrelated to the target words. Following this matching 
scheme, each participant received a unique set of homograph-target pairs, with 10 pairs of each 
pairing type (related-negative, related-benign, unrelated-negative, unrelated-benign). The 
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remaining 40 homographs that did not fully meet the selection criteria for rumination and benign 
homograph pairings were randomly paired with a non-word target. Given the small number of 
rumination-related homographs, this pairing scheme allowed us to make sure the best stimuli 
were used for the critical targets rather than with non-words.  
Questionnaires.  The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991), a 22-item questionnaire was used to assess the tendency to engage in ruminative thinking 
in response to negative mood. Brooding and reflection scores were calculated by using the five 
items identified by Treynor et al. (2003) for each subscale. Internal reliability of the RRS and its 
brooding and reflection subscales in the current sample was good (α = .92, .86, .71 for the overall 
RRS scale and for brooding and reflection respectively). Participants also completed the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), a 21-item inventory that assesses 
the severity of depressive symptoms. The internal reliability of the BDI as measured in the 
current study was high (α = .89). Descriptive statistics for these self-report measures are reported 
in Table 1. Both measures have been widely used in Hebrew and have been reported to have 
good predictive validity (e.g., Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Zalsman, Weizman, Carel, & Aizenberg, 
2001). 
Procedure 
Following consent, participants completed the lexical decision task. We first described 
the two-part structure of the trials and asked them to determine as quickly as possible whether 
each letter string in the second part of each trial formed a word. Participants completed five 
practice trials, during which the experimenter was present in the room to ensure the task was 
performed correctly. The experimental trials were randomly presented in a single block. Each 
trial was preceded by a centrally located + sign, presented for 2000 ms. The homograph was 
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presented for 750 ms and followed by the target, which remained on the screen until the 
participant responded by pressing the F or K keys to indicate whether or not the target formed a 
word. The key press initiated the next trial with an ISI of 2000 ms. Following the lexical decision 
task, participants filled out the BDI and the RRS, presented on the computer in a random order 
and followed by a brief demographic questionnaire. At the end of the session, participants were 
asked to describe their experiences throughout the experiment and to indicate their thoughts 
regarding the goal of the study. None of the participants was aware of the true nature of the 
experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
Only reaction times (RTs) for correct decisions were analyzed. The overall error rate was 
low (M = 0.03, SD = 0.04) and error rates did not differ by trial type, F < 1.0. Data were trimmed 
by removing reaction times faster than 200 ms and slower than 2000 ms (1% of responses). In 
addition, we removed from the analyses data from three participants whose mean RT was more 
than two standard deviations above the mean RT of the sample.  
We computed an interpretation bias score by subtracting the latency to respond to targets 
related to the negative meaning of the homograph from the latency to respond to targets related 
to the benign meaning of the homograph. Similarly, we computed a negativity bias score by 
subtracting the latency to respond to negative targets unrelated to the homograph from the 
latency to respond to benign targets that were unrelated to the homograph.  
Correlations between bias measures, rumination, reflection, and brooding are presented in 
Table 2. As can been seen in the table, overall rumination scores as well as brooding and 
reflection were significantly and positively correlated with interpretation bias scores but not with 
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negativity bias scores. Depression scores on the BDI were unrelated to both interpretation and 
negativity bias scores.  
We conducted three hierarchical regression analyses, to further examine the link between 
rumination, brooding and reflection on the one hand and interpretation bias on the other. In these 
regression analyses, rumination, brooding or reflection scores served as the outcome measure; 
we entered negativity bias scores in the first model and added interpretation bias scores in a 
subsequent model. Thus, these analyses allowed us to test whether the relationship between the 
outcome measures and interpretation bias, holds up after accounting for negativity bias. 
These analyses (presented in Table 3) indicated that whereas interpretation bias scores 
significantly predicted rumination, brooding, and reflection, negativity bias scores did not. The 
first model accounted for 2% of the variance in rumination and in brooding (p > .3), and none in 
reflection (p = .93). The second model added significantly to the prediction, accounting for 13%, 
10%, and 11% of the variance in rumination, brooding, and reflection respectively; Fchange (1, 43) 
= 6.86, p = .01 for rumination; Fchange(1, 43) = 4.58, p = .038, for brooding; and Fchange (1, 43) = 
5.48, p = .02 for reflection.  
Thus, our prediction that brooding would be related to interpretation biases was 
confirmed. Brooding was not associated with a general tendency to respond more rapidly to 
negative than to benign targets.  Brooding was associated with a faster response to targets that 
were related to the negative meanings as compared to those that related to the benign meanings 
of the homographs. Contrary to our expectation, interpretation biases were not uniquely linked 
with brooding, but were also related to reflection and to overall rumination scores.  
Experiment 2 
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In Experiment 1, we did not examine the specificity of the interpretation bias to 
rumination-relevant content. At the start, however, we also hypothesized that rumination is 
associated with an interpretation bias when processing ambiguous stimuli that can be interpreted 
in a rumination-relevant manner, but not in processing other ambiguous stimuli. To examine this 
prediction in Experiment 2, we used homographs with negative meanings that were either 
ruminative (e.g., stern, strain, blue) or threatening (e.g., mug, alarm, club). By including 
homographs in the threatening category, we hoped to demonstrate that rumination would be 
characterized by a bias that seems specific to negative pondering while one is feeling sad and not 
just a bias to think negative thoughts. We also included a set of homographs with personal but 
non-negative meanings and paired them with targets that denoted their impersonal meaning (e.g., 
reflect-mirror, relish-mustard, well-water). This benign category of homographs was used to 
disguise the purpose of the study, so that participants would not believe that all primes were 
negative nor adopt a strategy of anticipating that negative targets would follow homographic 
primes. Again, due to the limited number of rumination-related homographs available—this time 
in the English language—we could not tests all of our predictions in the same experiment. An 
important feature of Experiment 2, in contrast to Experiment 1, was our presentation of the same 
target words following both related and unrelated homographs. This strategy allowed us to 
conclude that any effects we observe are not just due to the nature of the specific targets that 
were used.  
Method  
Participants 
Participants were 13 female and 15 male undergraduate students who enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses or participated in summer research at Trinity University. (Age 
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was not recorded because rarely are Trinity-University students older than 22.) Participants 
received either course credit or monetary compensation upon the completion of the session.  
Materials  
 Lexical decision task. This task consisted of 92 trials of prime-target presentations. Each 
trial belonged to one of four different categories: related word trials, unrelated word trials, 
related non-word trials, and unrelated non-word trials. The non-word trials were created by 
pairing 46 non-homographs with either their related targets (e.g., speaker-talk) or their unrelated 
targets (e.g., hatch-paper) and then changing one letter in each target word to produce a 
pronounceable non-word (e.g., speaker-malk, hatch-baper). In total, 23 related non-word trials 
and 23 unrelated non-word trials were created, and they served as fillers to disguise the nature of 
the study.  
The word trials involved pairings of 46 homographic primes and their targets in ways that 
created 23 related and 23 unrelated trials. These homographs belonged to one of three different 
categories: ruminative, benignly personal, or threatening. The ruminative category was 
comprised of 16 homographs with personal meanings that were negative and, in our opinion, 
brooding-related (e.g., bitter); they were each paired with targets denoting their negative 
meaning (e.g., bitter-resentful). The threatening category contained 16 homographs, each of 
which was paired with a target denoting its negative meaning (e.g., beat-hit). Finally, the benign 
category consisted of 14 homographs with benignly personal meanings (e.g., reflect); these 
homographs were paired with targets denoting their impersonal meanings (e.g., reflect-mirror). 
Because very few brooding-related homographs are available, we did not compare latencies to 
respond to both meanings of the homograph (e.g., brooding and benign meanings). Instead, in 
this experiment, we compared latencies to respond when the targets were preceded by related or 
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unrelated homographs. For this purpose, each category of pairs was divided into two subsets, and 
all subsets were balanced according to the frequency with which normed responses to the 
homographs belong to the same category of homograph meaning as the chosen targets (mainly in 
norms collected by Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark, 1994, and supplemented by the norms from 
Nelson, McEvoy & Schreiber, 1998).   
Re-pairing for the unrelated trials was done with caution to ensure that the new pairs 
were not semantically related. Subsequently, two versions of the task were made in order to 
counterbalance subsets with relatedness of the pair. For example, if bitter-resentful was a related 
pair in the first version, then in the second version bitter was paired with stress, an associate of 
strain, to form an unrelated pair.  Each version consisted of 92 prime-target pairs, half of which 
were related and the other half unrelated. The related and unrelated trials each consisted of 8 
negative, 7 benign, 8 threat, and 23 non-homographic pairs.  
Procedure 
After informed consent, participants completed the lexical decision task. The task 
included 12 initial practice trials and 92 experimental trials divided into 8 blocks. Except the last, 
each block consisted of 6 non-homographic and 6 homographic pairs (two from each of the three 
categories: negative, benign, and threat); half of the pairs in each block were related and half 
unrelated. The last block was similar, except it contained no benign pairs and only four filler 
pairs. All trials in a block were randomized anew for each participant.  
On each trial, a prime appeared in the center of the screen for 750 ms before being 
replaced by its target. Participants were instructed to read the first word that appeared and, after 
the letter-string replaced the word, to quickly and accurately judge whether the letter-string 
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formed a word or a non-word by pressing keys labeled W or N. The key press initiated an inter-
stimulus interval of 1000 ms.  
After task completion, participants filled out the BDI-II, the RRS, and the trait 
version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, 
& Jacobs, 1983) and sealed all the paper forms in an envelope, under the understanding that 
it would not be opened by the experimenter. (Descriptive statistics for the self-report 
measures are reported in Table 1.) At the end of the session, prior to debriefing, 
participants were asked to disclose any speculation regarding the nature of the study and to 
elaborate on their experiences throughout the experiment in an attempt to ensure that 
participants were not aware of the manipulation; no participant showed such awareness. 
Results and Discussion 
Only reaction times (RTs) for correct responses were analyzed. The overall error rate was 
low (M = 0.02, SD = 0.02). When proportion of errors on word trials was submitted to an 
analysis of variance with within-subjects factors for relatedness to prime and homograph type, 
we found that they differed significantly according to homograph type, F(2, 54) = 3.97, MSE = 
.002, p = .025. Errors were more frequent following ruminative homographs (M = .03, compared 
to .01 for the other categories).  
We computed interpretation bias scores for each trial type by subtracting the latency to 
respond on related trials from the latency to respond on unrelated trials. Table 3 presents zero-
order correlations between measures of interpretation bias, anxiety, depression, rumination, 
reflection, and brooding. As can been seen in the table, rumination, reflection, and brooding were 
all significantly correlated with ruminative bias scores and not with threatening bias scores. A 
tendency to avoid benign personal interpretations was associated with reflection scores but not 
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with brooding or the overall RRS score. BDI and STAI scores were not significantly correlated 
with any of the biases. Thus, our prediction that brooding would be characterized by a bias to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli in a rumination consistent manner was confirmed. This ruminative 
bias was not unique to brooding and was also related to reflection and overall ruminative 
thinking. No aspect of rumination was associated with a tendency to make threatening 
interpretations. Unexpectedly, reflection scores were correlated with a tendency to interpret 
benign homographs in a non-personal manner.  
Finally, we conducted three hierarchical regression analyses to further examine the link 
between rumination, brooding and reflection on the one hand and interpretation bias on the other. 
The outcome measure was the rumination, brooding, or reflection score. Threat bias scores and 
impersonal-benign bias scores were entered first, followed by interpretation bias scores. Thus, 
these analyses allowed us to test whether the rumination-related bias holds up after accounting 
for the other forms of bias. These analyses (presented in Table 5) indicated that whereas 
interpretation bias scores for rumination-related content significantly predicted brooding and 
reflection, the other forms of bias did not. The first model accounted for a nonsignificant15% of 
the variance in brooding scores (p = .13) and a significant 22% of the variance in reflection 
scores, F(1, 25) = 3.46, p = 0.05. The second model added significantly to the prediction, 
accounting for an additional 16% of the variance in brooding (Fchange (1, 24) = 5.54, p = .03) and 
an additional 17% of the variance in reflection (Fchange (1, 24) = 6.87, p = .015). Interestingly, 
reflection was predicted by interpretation biases concerning both brooding-related content and 
benign personal content. The full model accounted for 39% of the variance in reflection, F(3, 24) 
= 5.14, p = .007. The model predicting rumination was not significant, F(3, 24) = 1.77, p = .18. 
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Clearly, the bivariate correlation between the rumination bias and the total rumination score was 
not significant when allowing for partial correlations with the other bias scores. 
General Discussion 
The present research investigated the link between rumination and interpretation 
biases. In the two experiments presented here, we have demonstrated that rumination is 
associated with a tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a rumination-consistent 
manner. In Experiment 1, higher rumination levels were predicted by faster response times 
to targets related to the ruminative meaning of homographs compared to the non-
ruminative meaning of these homographs. Rumination was not associated with a tendency 
to respond faster to other negative compared to neutral targets, thus substantiating the claim 
that an interpretive process is involved. Contrary to prediction, this interpretive bias was 
linked to reflection and overall rumination scores and was not specific to brooding, the 
particularly maladaptive form of rumination. In Experiment 2, brooding, reflection, and 
overall rumination scores were all characterized by faster response times to targets related 
to the ruminative meaning of homographs, compared to the same targets when they were 
not meaningfully related to the priming homographs. Rumination as well as brooding and 
reflection were not associated with a tendency to infuse ambiguous stimuli with threat-
related meaning. Unexpectedly, reflection was associated with a tendency to avoid benign 
personal interpretations.  
The evidence we provide that links rumination with a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information in a rumination-consistent manner is particularly compelling given 
the convergent findings from both experiments. In the two experiments, we employed 
different ways of operationalizing interpretive biases and found similar effects using 
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stimuli in two different languages. Our findings extend those of Hertel and El Messidi 
(2006), who showed that induced rumination leads to interpretation biases among 
dysphoric individuals. We demonstrated that self-described habitual rumination, regardless 
of depression level, is associated with a negative interpretation style. We also addressed the 
specificity of ruminative biases by showing their distinction from a general negative bias or 
a bias toward threatening interpretations.  
This particular form of a negative interpretation style may be part of what makes 
rumination a risk factor for psychopathology. Ruminators process information in ways that 
make negative information salient. They attend to it more readily (Joormann, Dkane, & 
Gotlib, 2006), show difficulty disengaging from it (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De 
Raedt, 2011), and have trouble forgetting it (Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Joormann & Tran, 
2009). Our findings add to this list by showing that ruminators find negative meaning in 
ambiguous material—in particular in ambiguous material where the negative interpretation 
is specific to rumination and not more generally negative. These findings are important in 
demonstrating that cognitive biases in attention, memory and interpretation are not just 
concomitants of emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression, but are associated 
with know risk factors for these disorders. They add to a growing body of work that 
demonstrates cognitive biases in people at risk for emotional disorders (e.g., Dearing & 
Gotlib, 2009).   
Our findings regarding the specificity of the bias to particular components of 
rumination are straightforward. Experiment 1 provided no evidence of such specificity, 
because the interpretation bias was associated with scores on both subscales—brooding and 
reflection—and with the overall score on the RRS. Experiment 2 produced similar results, 
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although the relation with the total rumination score was no longer significant when 
allowing for correlations with other biases. These findings may seem at odds with prior 
work that considers brooding a uniquely maladaptive form of rumination. However, recent 
research has shown that reflection is also associated with negative outcomes such as high 
levels of suicidal ideation, eating disorders and depression (Cowdrey & Park, 2012; 
Marroquín, Fontes, Scilletta & Miranda, 2010; Surrence, Miranda, Marroquín & Chan, 
2009), and cognitive biases (e.g., Whitmer & Banich, 2012). 
At first blush, the correlation between reflection and the tendency to interpret 
homographs with benign meanings in impersonal ways might suggest some sort of 
avoidance of personal interpretation when material is not ruminative. Instead, however, it is 
important to realize that the bias score is simply a measure of how much a prime speeds 
responding to related targets, compared to unrelated targets. Therefore, a more 
parsimonious conclusion is that reflection subscores were related to priming, regardless of 
the valence of the prime-target pair. However, this explanation is not consistent with the 
lack of correlation with threatening prime-target pairs. We are therefore left with the 
possibility that the correlation with benign pairs was a type I error, and may be associated 
with the relatively small size of the sample.  
No study is without limitations. A main limitation of the current research involves 
the paucity of available rumination-related homographs in both Hebrew and English, which 
dictated the use of non-fully randomized stimuli presentation (Experiment 1) or the use of 
only one set of the meanings associated with the homographs (Experiment 2). It was partly 
for this reason that we conducted the two experiments by using different lexical-priming 
methods. Clearly, future research would benefit from the use of ambiguous materials other 
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than homographs, such as ambiguous scenarios with varying possibilities for resolutions 
(e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) or an auditory interpretation task (Rinck, Klein, 
Bakens, van Niekerk, & Becker, 2012), that afford more flexibility in stimulus selection. A 
second limitation of the study is the relatively small sample size of both studies. Although 
both studies were not characterized by a restriction of range of rumination and 
psychopathology measures, it is still possible that some of the null effects observed in the 
study can be attributed to low statistical power.  
Despite the importance in understanding cognitive biases that characterize or 
contribute to depression and other disorders with ruminative features, research on 
interpretation biases related to depression still lags behind similar research on anxiety 
disorders.  Findings from our experiments may help in further understanding the 
mechanisms of rumination and, perhaps, in developing ways to modify these biases and 
their emotional consequences (see Hertel & Mathews, 2011).  
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Table 1. 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for the Self-Report Measures 
 Exp 1 Exp 2 
BDI 6.5 (6.5) 11.6 (9.5) 
RRS 37.8 (11.2) 47.2 (12.0) 
Brooding subscale 9.0 (3.3) 11.2 (3.5) 
Reflection subscale 8.2 (2.80) 10.6 (3.5) 
STAI-trait form -- 42.5 (13.2) 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory-II; RRS = Ruminative  
Response Scale; STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
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Table 2. 
Experiment 1: Correlations Between Bias Scores and Measures of Dysphoria and Rumination (N 
= 46) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 BDI      
2 RRS .43**     
3 Brooding subscale .52** .82**    
4 Reflection subscale .12 .64** .28   
5 Interpretation bias .11 .39** .33* .33*  
6 Negativity bias -.05 .16 .14 .01 .20 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory-II; RRS = Ruminative Response Scale.  
*p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 3. 
Brooding, reflection and rumination scores predicted by interpretation bias and negativity bias 
(N = 46) 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable B SE β t 
Rumination Negativity bias score 0.01 0.022 0.08 .57 
 Interpretation bias score 0.05 0.018 0.37 2.62* 
      
Brooding Negativity bias score 0.00 0.007 0.08 0.51 
 Interpretation bias score 0.01 0.006 0.31 2.14* 
      
Reflection Negativity bias score -0.00 0.006 -0.05 .71 
 Interpretation bias score 0.01 0.005 0.34 2.34* 
Note. *p < .05 
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Table 4. 
Experiment 2:  Correlations Between Bias Scores and Measures of Trait Anxiety, Dysphoria, 
and Rumination (N = 28) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 STAI-trait        
2 BDI .82**       
3 RRS .60* .43**      
4 Brooding subscale .41* .25 .80**     
5 Reflection subscale .35 .21 .74** .68**    
6 Ruminative bias .22 .21 .39* .50** .46*   
7 Benign bias  .06 -.05 .17 .14 .43*  .02  
8 Threatening bias  -.03 -.09 -.13 -.33 -.07 -.31 .22 
Note. STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory-II; RRS = 
Ruminative Response Scale. *p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 5. 
Brooding, reflection and rumination scores predicted by benign, threat, and ruminative bias (N 
= 28) 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable B SE β t 
Rumination Benign bias score 2.51 2.39 0.21 1.05 
 Threatening bias score -2.07 2.39 -0.17 -0.87 
 Ruminative bias score 4.46 2.34 0.37 1.91 
      
Brooding Benign bias score 0.77 0.66 0.22 1.16 
 Threatening bias score -1.32 0.66 -0.38 -1.97 
 Ruminative bias score 1.47 0.63 0.42 2.35* 
      
Reflection Benign bias score 1.64 0.63 0.47 2.60* 
 Threatening bias score -0.62 0.63 -0.18 0.34 
 Ruminative bias score 1.53 0.58 0.44 2.62* 
Note. *p < .05 
 
 
